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THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND CORPORATE SLUSH FUNDS:
SOME FIFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS
The post-Watergate era of public morality
has, at least temporarily, led Americans to
demand higher standards from public officials
in both their official and unofficial conduct.
Everything from the abuse of official power, to
tax returns, to the personal morals of public
officials has become a matter of public concern.
But public officials are not the only ones to
feel the impact of the new post-Watergate stan-
dards. Partially as a result of corporate involve-
ment in the Watergate scandal, the activities of
corporations and corporate officials have also
come under increased scrutiny.
During the summer of 1973, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) began to cooperate
closely with. the Watergate Special Prosecutor's
office. The IRS initiated a special program
designed to uncover "tax violations committed
by donors or recipients of campaign contribu-
tions, primarily in the 1972 Presidential cam-
paign."' Aided by information from the IRS,
the Watergate Special Prosecutor's investiga-
tions into illegal corporate campaign contribu-
tions resulted in a number of guilty pleas by
corporate officials and corporations. 2
On April 7, 1976, the IRS expanded the
scope of its investigation beyond its original
Watergate focus on domestic campaign contri-
butions to cover both foreign and domestic
bribes, kickbacks and campaign contributions.
The IRS issued a new set of instructions to its
field offices requiring that the examining of-
fices ask a minimum of eleven questions to
present and past corporate officials and em-
ployees.3 The instructions require that the
I WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, RE-
PORT 220 (Oct. 1975).
2 The Watergate Special Prosecutor reported that
18 corporate officials and 17 corporations had pled
guilty to violations of campaign contribution laws.
Id. at 158-59.
'The full text of the 11 questions follows:
1. Did the corporation, any corporate officer
or employee or any third party acting on behalf
of the corporation, make, directly or indirectly,
any bribes, kickbacks or other payments regard-
less of form, whether in money, property or
services to any employee, person, company or
organization, or any representative of any per-
son, company or organization to obtain favora-
59
questions be asked in the IRS's large case au-
dits. which cover approximately 1200 major
corporations, each of which has gross assets
ble treatment in securing business or to other-
wise obtain special concessions, or to pay for
favorable treatment for business secured or for
special concessions already obtained?
2. Did the corporation, any corporate officer
or employee or any third party acting on behalf
of the corporation, make any bribes, kickbacks
or other payments regardless of form whether
in money, property or services, directly or indi-
rectly, to or for the benefit of any government
official or employee, domestic or foreign,
whether on the national level or a lower level
such as state, county or local (in the case of a
foreign government also including any level
inferior to the national level) and including
regulatory agencies or governmentally-con-
trolled businesses, corporations, companies or
societies, for the purpose of affecting his/her
action or the action of the government he/she
represents to obtain favorable treatment in se-
curing business or to obtain special concessions,
or to pay for business secured or special conces-
sions obtained in the past?
3. Were corporate funds donated, loaned or
made available, directly or indirectly, to or
for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose
of opposing, any government or subdivision
thereof, political party, candidate or committee
either domestic or foreign?
4. Was corporate property of any kind do-
nated, loaned, or made available, directly or
indirectly, to or for the use or benefit of, or for
the purpose of opposing, any government or
subdivision thereof, political party, candidate
or committee either domestic or foreign?
5. Was any corporate officer or employee
compensated, directly or indirectly, by the cor-
poration for time spent or expenses incurred in
performing services for the benefit of or for the
purpose of opposing, any'government or subdi-
vision thereof, political party, candidate or com-
mittee, either domestic or foreign?
6. Did the corporation make any loans, dona-
tions or other disbursements, directly or indi-
rectly, to corporate officers or employees or
others for the purpose of making contributions,
directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of,
or for the purpose of opposing, any government
or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate
or committee, either domestic or foreign?
7. Did the corporation make any loans, dona-
tions or other disbursements directly or indi-
rectly, to corporate officers or employees or
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exceeding $250,000,000.1 The questions will be
asked of "those who can reasonably be expected
to have had knowledge of the existence or
nonexistence of any such scheme."5 The eleven
questions place no duty to investigate the facts
on the corporate officers and employees. They
are expected to answer only "to the best of
their knowledge, belief and recollection."6 The
first two questions deal with bribes and kick-
backs to government officials and to private
individuals and companies. Questions three
and four inquire whether corporate funds or
property were used to support or oppose any
foreign or domestic political party or candidate.
The next three questions ask whether the cor-
others for the purpose of reimbursing such
corporate officers, employees or others for con-
tributions made, directly or indirectly, for the
use or benefit of, or for the purpose of oppos-
ing, any government or subdivision thereof,
political party, candidate or committee, either
domestic or foreign?
8. Does now or did any corporate officer or
employee or any third party acting on behalf of
the domestic corporation have signatory or
other authority or control over disbursements
from foreign bank accounts?
9. Does now or did the corporation maintain
a bank account or any other account of any
kind, either domestic or foreign, which account
was not reflected on the corporate books, rec-
ords, balance sheets, or financial statements?
10. Does now or did the corporation or any
other person or entity acting on behalf of the
corporation maintain a domestic or foreign
numbered account or an account in a name
other than the name of the corporation?
11. Which other present or former corporate
officers, directors, employees, or other persons
acting on behalf of the corporation may have
knowledge concerning any of the above areas;,
Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590, [1976] 9
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) T 6567.
4 The 11 questions will also be addressed to
,smaller corporations if warranted by the facts and
circumstances in a particular case." Internal Revenue
News Release IR-1615, [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 6639.
' The Internal Revenue Manual Supplement notes
that these individuals:
would include, for example, chief executive
officer, chief financial officer, officer in charge
of international operations, officer in charge of
governmental activities, directors who are not
corporate officers but who serve on audit com-
mittees or have similar responsibilities, and oth-
ers as appropriate.
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, MS 42G-348, § 3.01.
1 Internal Revenue News Release IR-1615, [1976] 9
STAND. FED. TAX REP. Ti 6639.
poration compensated its officers or employees
for services rendered or contributions made to
support or oppose any foreign or domestic
political party or candidate. Questions eight,
nine and ten probe whether the corporation
has or controls a foreign bank account, and if
so, whether the account is reflected on the
books of the corporation and whether the ac-
count is in the corporation's own name. Ques-
tion eleven seeks the identity of present or
former corporate officers, directors or employ-
ees who might have information about any of
the preceding questions.
Based on responses from 896 of the 1200
corporations in its eleven question investiga-
tion, the IRS issued a preliminary report which
indicated that it had uncovered 481 potentially
illegal corporate slush funds and 71 potential
cases of criminal fraud. The IRS received no
response from 304 corporations. Summonses
were to be sent to the officers and employees
of these corporations to obtain their responses
to the questions.
7
As might be expected, corporate officials are
not always willing to answer the eleven ques-
tions. Irrespective of any wrongdoing by the
corporation or its officers and employees, the
questions are themselves viewed as offensive.8
According to some corporate executives, the
"questionable activities" which the questions are
designed to uncover are necessary to prevent
the corporation from being placed at a compet-
itive disadvantage, particularly in its foreign
operations. 9 Furthermore, they fear that the
7 DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), June 6, 1977, at G-7-
8.
" The American Bar Association's Section on Tax-
ation viewed the 11 questions as provoking hostility
between the business community and the IRS. The
Section on Taxation considered that the 11 ques-
tions unfairly cast suspicion on the corporate officers
and employees of the nation's largest corporations.
See Simmons, The "Eleven Questions"-An Extraordinary
New Audit Technique, 30 TAX LAW. 23, 29 (1976). The
scope of the questions was also a source of aggra-
vation. The questions were termed "vague, ambigu-
ous and extraordinarily broad." Id. at 32.
9 Disclosure of questionable payments to the IRS
would most likely be accompanied by disclosure to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
eventual public disclosure to the corporation's share-
holders and the general public. Under §§ 13 and
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970), an issuer of registered securi-
ties is required to file reports which the SEC deems
necessary and appropriate for the protection of
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potential exposure of questionable corporate
payments may lead to a legislative or regulatory
backlash which could restrict the corporation's
future operations in the United States and
abroad.' 0 Public revelation that the corporation
investors. SEC Rules 13a-ll and 15d-11 require that
the issuer file a current report on Form 8-K. Item 13
of Form 8-K provides that the "registrant may, at its
option, report... any events.., which the regis-
trant deems of material importance to security hold-
ers." In Securities Release 8265 (March 8, 1974), the
SEC took the'position that Form 8-K (or the annual
report Form 10-K) should be used to disclose illegal
,campaign contributions. Subsequently, many disclo-
sures of illegal campaign contributions and other
questionable corporate payments have become public
knowledge through reports filled with the SEC by
the corporation. This level of disclosure would prob-
ably force most corporations to abandon making
future payments.
Some businessmen maintain that unless they bribe
foreign governmental officials, their businesses will
be severely damaged. See Yates, Businessmen Find
Payoffs Are Key to Making a Profit in Asian Nations,
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 24, 1977 § 4, at 11, col. 2.
The fear is expressed that if American businesses
are prohibited from paying bribes to foreign officials,
companies from other nations which are not so
restricted will gain a competitive advantage. How-
ever, former Secretary of Commerce Elliott Richard-
son reported that no substantial evidence had been.
advanced to support the competitive disadvantage
theory. Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings
on S. 3133, S. 3379 & S. 3418 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 42 (1976) (letter from.Sec. Elliot Richardson to
Sen. William Proxmire) [hereinafter cited as Prohibit-
ing Bribes]. In a number of cases involving the sales
of aircraft, questionable payments were "made not to
'out-compete' foreign competitors, but rather to gain
an edge over other U.S. manufactureis." Id.
A Wall Street Journal survey of 25 large American
corporations that had disclosed making questionable
foreign payments revealed that "not one of the 25
firms reports losing a significant portion of its foreign
business." Pappas, Crackdown on Bribery Hasn't Damaged
Sales, Big Companies Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1977,
at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.). It is possible that there
has been a loss of bribe-related foreign sales but
that this loss is offset by a postrecession increase in
the level of foreign business activity. Another possi-
bility is that some of the questionable payments are
simply continuing in another form. Id.
10 Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 9, at 42-43. In one
instance one country declared that improper pay-
ments made by an oil company in a second country
motivated the first country to expropriate the oil
company's properties. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 15
(submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., May, 1976).
has made illegal payments may cause the offi-
cers responsible for making, authorizing or
simply allowing the payments to lose their
jobs." Finally, of course, it is clear that answers
to the questions which disclose corporate
bribes, kickbacks and illegal campaign contri-
butions could subject the corporations to back
taxes, penalties and fines and its officers and
employees to fines and jail sentences. 2
The possibility that an officer or employee
may subject himself to criminal liability by an-
" For example, the revelation of Gulf Oil Corpo-
ration's illegal payments led to the ouster of four
high-ranking Gulf executives, including Gulf's chair-
man. See Calme, At Gulf Oil Nowadays A "Questionable"
Deal Is One to Be Shunned, Wall St. J., Jan. 25. 1977,
at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.).
12 The corporation would be liable for taxes due
for deductions disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(c).
Under § 162, no deduction is allowed for an illegal
payment to domestic governmental officials or em-
ployees or for payments to foreign governmental
officials or employees if the payment would be illegal
if it were made to a domestic governmental official
or employee. In addition, no deduction is allowable
for bribes, kickbacks or other illegal payments to any
persons if these payments are illegal under the laws
of the United States or if illegal under state laws if
the state laws are generally enforced and subject "the
payor to criminal penalty or the loss of license or
privilege." I.R.C. §162(c)(2). See 26 C.F.R. §1.162-
18 (1976).
Penalties would be assessed for failure to pay the
tax due. I.R.C. § 6653. The corporation could also
be fined for attempting to evade or defeat the tax.
I.R.C. § 7201. The corporate officers and employees
might be fined or imprisoned for attempting to evade
or defeat the tax. I.R.C. § 7201.
In addition to the Internal Revenue Code sanc-
tions, the corporation and its officers and employees
might also be subject to fines and imprisonment for
violations of non-tax laws. Potentially applicable stat-
utes include: 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(violation of dollar limits on campaign contributions);
2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(a) (Supp. Sept. 1976) (contribution
by national banks or corporations); 2 U.S.C.A. §
441c (Cum. Supp. 1977) (contributions by govern-
ment contractors); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975) (re-
straint of trade); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974) (mo-
nopoly); 15 U.S.C. 13(c) (1970) (brokerage provision
of Robinson-Patman Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a),
78o(d) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. V 1975)
(violation of reporting requirements of Securities
Exchange Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (aiding and
abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (bribery of public
officials); 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1970) (bribing members
of congress, government officers and employees); 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1970) (false statement filed with federal agency); 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(1970) (fraud by wire).
COMMENTS
swering the eleven questions suggests that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation should be available to the corporate
officers and employees who are asked to re-
spond to the questions. This comment will
consider the availability of the privilege against
self-incrimination to the corporation's employ-
ees and officers, the proper time for claiming
the privilege, and the adequacy of a grant of
immunity for corporate officials reluctant to
answer the eleven questions.
AVAILABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE
Determining whether a corporate official
may claim the fifth amendment privilege when
confronted with the eleven questions requires
an understanding of the policies underlying
the privilege and a consideration of the excep-
tional situations in which the privilege is not
available. The privilege has been hailed as "one
of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized."'' In Murphy v. Water-
front Coinmision , 4 the Supreme Court noted
that the privilege "reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspirations."' '
According to the Court, one of the fundamen-
tal values was "our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."' 6 A
second value which the privilege protects is
"respect for the integrity and worth of the
individual citizen.' 7 Historically, the origin of
the privilege is "closely linked with the abolition
of torture," 8 and the fifth amendment reflects
our founding fathers' conscious selection of an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial crimi-
nal process. A third value which the privilege
fosters is respect for the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system. If the privilege were not
available, the government might be tempted to
rely progressively less on thorough, factual
investigations and increasingly on its power to
extract answers as a means to dispose of crimi-
I" E. GRISWOLD, IHE FiFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 7
(1955).
14 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Is Id. at 55.
16 Id. If the individual answered correctly, he
might be accusing himself of a crime; if he answered
incorrectly, he would be liable for perjury; and if he
remained silent, he might be subject to contempt of
court.
17 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
18 E. GRISWOLD,SUpra note 13, at 7.
nal cases.iY Fourth, the privilege also protects,
to some extent, the individual's right to privacy.
As early as Boyd v. United States,2 0 the Court
held that compulsory production of an individ-
ual's private papers would compel the individ-
ual to be a witness against himself. 1 Boyd stated
that the "constitutional provisions for the secu-
rity of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction de-
prives them of half their efficacy and leads to a
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it con-
sisted more in sound than in substance. 2 2
However, while the role of the fifth amend-
ment in protecting personal privacy has often
been affirmed by the Supreme Court 2 3 most
recently the Court has shown a tendency to
limit the fifth amendment's function as a pro-
tector of privacy .24
Although the privilege both reflects and pro-
tects values which our society considers of fun-
damental importance, the utilization of the
privilege clearly impairs the government's abil-
ity to obtain vital information. Aware of the
tension between the government's need for
information and the individual's privilege
,9 Wigmore felt that under a system of compulsory
self-disclosure, the criminal justice system tended to
"suffer morally." He stated:
The inclination develops to rely mainly upon
such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incom-
plete investigation of other sources. The exer-
cise of the power to extract answers begets a
forgetfulness of the just limitations of that
power.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
20 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" Boyd was decided on both fourth and fifth
amendment grounds. The Court "noticed the inti-
mate relation between the two Amendments." Id. at
633.22 Id. at 635.
'See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973);
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Schott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
214 In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976),
the Court acknowledged that protecting personal
privacy was "one of several purposes served by the
constitutional privilege against compelled testimonial
self-incrimination." Id. at 399. But the Court main-
tained that it "has never suggested that every invasion
of privacy violates the privilege." Id. justice Brennan
disagreed sharply with the majority's interpretation
of privacy as a mere "by-product" of the fifth amend-
ment and not as a "factor controlling in part the
determination of the scope of the privilege." Id. at




against self-incrimination, the courts have in
two situations recognized exceptions to the
right to claim the privilege. The first involves
access to corporate records. Under the corpo-
rate records exception, the corporation may
not claim the privilege3 5 However, the IRS's
2 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
Given an understanding of the values which the fifth
amendment seeks to foster (see text accompanying
notes 13-24 supra), it can be readily seen why the
courts have consistently denied the corporation access
to the privilege. First, the privilege is unavailable to
the corporation because the corporation's right to
privacy is not impaired. In Hale, the Court held that a
corporation could not resist a subpoena on fifth
amendment grounds. The Court considered the cor-
poration to be a "creature of the state ... incor-
porated for the benefit of the public." 201 U.S. at
74. The corporation receives privileges from the
state and "holds them subject to the laws of the state
and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are
limited by law." Id. Thus, unlike the individual who
has rights which exist without any action by the state,
the corporation does not have a right of privacy
which can be asserted against the "visitorial power of
the state." Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382
(1911). The corporation's inability to claim the privi-
lege is related to the impersonal nature of the corpo-
ration. In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944),
the Court held that if an organization was "so imper-
sonal in the scope of membership and activities that
it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely
private or personal interests of its constituents, but
rather to embody their common or group interests
only," then the organization could not claim the
privilege. Id. at 701.
In addition, there is, of course, no danger of
government abuse of the corporation by physical
compulsion if the corporation is denied the privilege.
It would be absurd to think of the corporation being
subject to possible torture.
Finally, application of the privilege to the corpo-
ration would tend to weaken rather than increase
respect for the judicial system. Whatever possibilities
for a serious imbalance in power are inherent when
the power of the state is pitted against an individual,
these possibilities are much less likely when the state
faces a corporation, which often has access to sub-
stantial resources. Furthermore, evidence of most
corporate wrongdoing can usually be found in the
corporation's official records and documents. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §'2259a (McNaughton rev.
1961). "Were the cloak of privilege to be thrown
around these impersonal records and documents,
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws
would be impossible." United States v. White, 322
U.S. at 700. Respect for the judicial system would in-
evitably decline because of its inability to provide an
effective means of uncovering corporate crime.
Thus, since Hale, the Court has consistently denied
the privilege to the corporation and there is no indi-
cation of any retreat from this position. Rather, the
"corporate records" exception has been expanded to
eleven questions, although asked in the context
of an audit of the corporation's financial rec-
ords, are not directed toward an examination
of corporate records. Rather, they ask the
corporation's officers and employees to provide
answers, not corporate records or documents.
Thus the corporate records exception will not
prevent the officers and employees from claim-
ing the privilege. However, their ability to
claim the privilege may be affected by the
second exception to the privilege, the self-re-
porting/required records exception. Just as the
corporate records exception enables the gov-
ernment to gather information from a corpo-
ration, under the self-reporting/required rec-
ords exception, the government may compel
an individual to submit documents or reports.
The self-reporting statutes and the required
recbrds statutes are quite similar. Self-report-
ing or registration statutes are designed to elicit
particular kinds of information from the indi-
vidual. The individual is required to tender
the desired information to the agency which
regulates the activities described in the reports
without waiting for a specific request for the
information. Under a required records statute,
an individual must merely keep the records
available for inspection by the regulatory
agency. If the agency desires access to the
records, it may request or, if necessary, sub-
poena the records. Because the differences
between the required records exception and
the self-reporting exception are minimal, the
two exceptions are now commonly considered
to form a single required records exception to
the privilege against self-incrimination .2
deny the privilege to other collective groups. The
privilege has been denied to labor unions, United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and to partner-
ships. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
2 The Supreme Court sustained a sell-reporting
statute in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259
(1927), prior to its announcement of the required
records doctrine in Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1 (1948). There is no significant constitutional
difference between the two statutory schemes. The
only difference between the self-reporting statutes
and the required records statutes involves the time at
which the privilege may be claimed. "[W]ith a regis-
tration provision, the privilege can be invoked imme-
diately, whereas under a record-keeping statute the
claimant must wait until he is served with a
subpoena." Note, Required Information and the Privilege
Against Self-hncrimination, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 691
(1965). Subsequent. to Shapiro, the Supreme Court
has considered self-reporting and registration stat-
1978]
Several Supreme Court cases have attempted
to delineate the scope of the self-reporting
required records exception. In United Statei v.
Sullivan,'2 7 the Court sustained a self-reporting
tax statute. Sullivan, a bootlegger, failed to file
a tax return. He alleged that if he filed he
would incriminate himself for violating the
National Prohibition Act. Thus, he claimed
that the fifth amendment protected him from
filing a tax return. Mr. Justice Holmes rejected
Sullivan's claim and held that "the protection
of the 5th Amendment was pressed too far.1
2 8
Justice Holmes considered Sullivan's claims to
be an "extravagant application" of the privilege
because "[mi]ost of the items [on the tax return]
warranted no complaint. 2 9 Sullivan had at-
tempted to "draw a conjurer's circle around
the whole matter by his own declaration. ' :"°
Sullivan's income, although illegal, was still
subject to taxation, and so he was required to
file a return. However, in dictum, Justice
Holmes suggested that the privilege might be
available in a more limited context. He stated:
If the form, of return provided called for
answers that the defendant was privileged from
making he could have raised the objection on
the return, hut he could not on that account
refuse to make any return at all. We are not
called on to decide what, if anything, he might
have withheld.3
1
In Shapiro v. United States, " the Supreme
Court developed the required records excep-
tion. William Shapiro, a fruit and produce
wholesaler subject to the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act. had his business records subpoenaed
by the Price Administrator. The regulations
announced by the Price Administrator required
that a person subject to the regulations "keep
and make available for examination . . . rec-
ords of the same kind as he has customarily
kept . "... : When he turned his records over
to the Administrator,34 Shapiro claimed the
utes under the required records doctrine. See text ac-
comnpanying notes 39-73 infra.
27 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
21 Id. at 263.
29 Id.
Id. at 264.
.1 Id. at 263.
335 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 5 n.3.
When Shapiro produced his records, "[t]he pre-
siding official stated that the 'witness is entitled to
whatever immunity which flows as a matter of law
fifth amendment privilege and assumed that
he would receive a statutory grant of immunity
from prosecution regarding the information in
the subpoenaed records. However, when Shap-
iro was later tried for violating the Emergency
Price Control Act, his claim of immunity was
rejected. He appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court, but the Court affirmed, hold-
ing that there was no privilege for Shapiro's
required records. The Court assumed that
there were "limits which the government can-
not constitutionally exceed in requiring the
keeping of records."- Accordingly, it at-
tempted to limit the scope of its decision to
records which had "public aspects. 3 6 Further-
more, the Court limited its holding to situations
where there was
a sufficient relation between the activity sought
to be regulated and the public concern so that
the government can constitutionally regulate or
forbid the basic activity concerned, and can con-
stitutionally require the keeping of particular
records . .7
Despite the Court's attempts to limit its deci-
sion, Shapiro had potentially far-reaching impli-
cations. The required records exception could
very well have destroyed the fifth amendment
privilege if a legislature, by requiring records
to be kept, were able to overcome the privilege
with regard to all such records. Justice Frank-
furter criticized the reasoning involved in the
Court's decision:
Subtle question-begging is nevertheless ques-
tion-begging. Thus: records required to be kept
by law are public records; public records are
non-privileged; required records are non-privi-
leged.
If records merely because required to be kept
by law ipo facto become public records, we are
indeed living in glass houses. Virtually every
from the production of these books and records'."
Id. at 4. The statute which required the records to be
kept provided that no one would be excused from
compliance with the statute because of his privilege
against self-incrimination. Instead, the statute pro-
vided that immunity would be available "to any
individual who specifically claims such privilege." Id.
at 10 n.7. Shapiro claimed the privilege. However,
the Supreme Court held that under the required
records doctrine Shapiro was not entitled to claim
the privilege. Consequently the statute did not pro-
vide an) immunity to Shapiro.25 Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
17 Id. at 32.
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major public law enactment-to say nothing of
State and local legislation-has record-keeping
provisions. 38
The limits of Shapiro's required records doc-
trine were tested in Albertson v. Subversive Activ-
ities Control Board 9 -although curiously the
Court neglected any mention of Shapiro in its
opinion. 4 The court held that Albertson, a
member of the Communist party, could not be
required to register with the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board. The Court decided that in
registering, Albertson would encounter ob-
vious risks of incrimination. The Court com-
pared Albertson's situation with that encoun-
tered in Sullivan. The Court noted that:
[i]n Sullivan the questions in the income tax
return were neutral on their face and directed
at the public at large, but here they are directed
at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities. 4'
Furthermore, the Court found that Albertson's
claim of privilege arose "in an area permeated
with criminal statutes" and might lead to "the
admission of a crucial element of a crime.""
In Marchetti v. United States43 and Grosso v.
United States,44 the Court once again was con-
fronted with the required records doctrine.
Marchetti and Grosso were both gamblers.
Marchiti was convicted for failing to register
and pay an occupational tax imposed on gam-
blers; Grosso was convicted for failing to pay
an excise tax. Earlier, in United States v. Kah-
riger45 and Lewis v. United States,46 the Court
had upheld these same registration and occu-
"'Id. at 51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Shapiro's
required records doctrine has also been criticized by
commentators. See, e.g., McKay, Self-Incrimination and
the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. C-r. REV. 193, 215-18;
Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the
Privilige Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's
Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 148-50.
However, Shapiro is cited with approval in Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu-
tional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 716-17 (1968).
39 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
4o More surprisingly, the government's brief in
Albertson omitted any reference to Shapiro. See
Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and the
Hit-and-Run Opinions, 1971 SUp. CT. REV. 1, 7.
"1 382 U.S. at 79.
41/d.
43 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
44 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
45 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
- 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
pational tax requirements on the grounds that
the privilege "offers protection only as to past
and present acts" and would not protect the
prospective acts which Kahriger and Lewis
later engaged in.47 However, in light of its
recently decided Albertson case, the Court felt
compelled to reexamine the required records
doctrine because "every portion of these re-
quirements had the direct and unmistakable
consequence of incriminating petitioner."' 8
Noting the parallel to Albertson, the Court
found that "wagering is 'an area permeated
with criminal statutes,' and those engaged in
wagering are a group 'inherently suspect of
criminal activities'."4 9 While the Court acknowl-
edged the government's ability to tax unlawful
activities, the Court focused particularly on the
fact that the information that a gambler had
paid the occupational tax was "readily available
to assist the efforts of state and federal author-
ides to enforce these [criminal] penalties."5
Furthermore, evidence of compliance with fed-
eral wagering tax laws was "often . . . admitted
at trial in state and federal prosecutions for
gambling offences."'" In Marchetti, the Court
contrasted the petitioner's situation with that of
Shapiro, stating: "Each of the three principal
elements of the doctrine, as it is described in
Shapiro is absent from this situation. 5 2 First,
Marchetti was required to keep and preserve
records which he had not customarily kept.
Second, there were no public aspects to the
information sought. Third, the information
sought was not related to "an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inqtiry. ' ' 53 De-
claring that the "central standard for the privi-
lege's application has been whether the claim-
ant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary hazards of
incrimination, 5 4 the Court overturned Mar-
47 390 U.S. at 52. The Court's rationale in Lewis
was also based on a theory of implied waiver. Under
the implied waiver theory, when Lewis decided to
engage in gambling, he surrendered his fifth amend-
ment privilege. Marchetti rejected both the "non-pro-
spective" and waiver theories. See 390 U.S. at 50-54.
4s 390 U.S. at 49.
49 Id. at 47 (quoting Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79).5 1 Id. at 47.
31 Id.52 Id. at 56.
5 Id. at 57. In Grosso, the Court found that two of
the three Shapiro criteria were "plainly absent." Id. at
68. Furthermore, it was not clear whether the re-
maining criterion, that the records were customarily
kept, was present. Id. at 69.54 Id. at 53.
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chetti's and Grosso's convictions. Kahriger and
Lewis, which had barred the assertion of the
privilege, were overruled.5 5
Subsequent to Marchetti and Grosso, in Califor-
nia v. Byers,5 6 the Court again faced the ques-
tion whether the fifth amendment could be
claimed as a defense for failing to comply with
a registration requirement. In Byers, the re-
spondent was charged with failing to stop and
leave his name and address after being involved
in an automobile accident which had resulted
in property damage. Byers claimed that the
reporting requirement violated his privilege
against self-incrimination. Although the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had sustained Byers'
claim, the United States Supreme Court re-
jected it.
A plurality of the Court found no conflict
between the statutory reporting scheme and
the privilege. The plurality reviewed the "sub-
stantial hazards of self-incrimination" 57 test for-
mulated in Marchetti. Since the California stat-
ute was directed at all persons who drive auto-
mobiles in California, the plurality found it
"difficult to consider this group as either 'highly
selective' or 'inherently suspect of criminal ac-
tivities'." ' In addition, the plurality noted that
the California Supreme Court had construed
the statute as "not intended to facilitate criminal
convictions but to promote the satisfaction of
civil liabilities arising from automobile acci-
dents."5 9 Reasoning that "disclosures with re-
spect to automobile accidents simply do not
entail the kind of substantial risk involved in
Marchetti [and] Grosso "60 the plurality sustained
the reporting requirement.
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence provided a
majority for the result reached in Byers. How-
ever, his approach was significantly different
from that of the plurality. Justice Harlan ac-
knowledged that Marchetti and Grosso sug-
gested that "the applicability of the privilege
depends exclusively on a determination that,
from the individual's point of view, there are
'real' and not 'imaginary' risks of self-incrimina-
tion in yielding to state compulsion."'6 But, un-
5 Id. at 54.
56 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
51 Id. at 430 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
51 Id. at 431 (quoting Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79).
59 Id. at 430.
60 Id. at 431.
61 Id. at 437 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
like the plurality, Justice Harlan acknowledged
that there were real risks present in Byers. He
criticized the plurality for "indulging in a col-
lection of artificial, if not disingenuous judg-
ments that the risks of incrimination are not
there when they really are there ."62 Justice Har-
lan felt that Byers would have faced a real risk
of self-incrimination by complying with the re-
porting statute. He thought that if the plurality
had more honestly applied the "real risk"
standard it espoused, Byers' conviction would
not have been sustained. Furthermore, he rea-
soned that a logical application of the "real risk"
standard must either protect "all personal judg-
ments which are not patently frivolous" or lead
to "a grant of immunity potentially applicable
to all instances of compelled 'self-reporting.' "63
But Justice Harlan was dissatisfied with the log-
ical implications of the "real risk" standard and
articulated a rationale for reaching the same
result that the plurality had reached. Noting
the tension between the government's need for
information and the individual's privilege
against self-incrimination, he maintained that
respect for the integrity of the individual and
concern for individual privacy, values fostered
by the privilege,64 were not "of such overriding
significance that they compel substantial sacri-
fices in the pursuit of other governmental ob-
jectives in all situations" where disclosure
would contribute significantly to criminal law
enforcement. He feared that if an individual's
own perception of self-incrimination were suf-
ficient to impose
use restrictions on the government in all self-
reporting contexts, then the privilege threatens
the capacity of the government to respond to
societal needs with a realistic mixture of criminal
sanctions and other regulatory devices.6
Consequently, he suggested that explicit limits
be placed on the Marchetti-Grosso line of cases
(including the plurality opinion in Byers). To
determine what limits should be set on the
Marchetti-Grosso rationale, Justice Harlan pro-
62 Id. at 442.
63 Id.
In selecting these two values, Justice Harlan
relied on Dean McKay's analysis of the purposes of
the privilege. See McKay, supra note 38, at 209-11.
' 402 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment).66 Id. at 452.
COMMENTS [Vol. 69
CORPORATE SLUSH FUNDS
posed consideration of three factors:
an evaluation of the assertedly noncriminal
governmental purpose in securing the informa-
tion, the necessity for self-reporting as a means
of securing the informaion, and the nature of
the disclosures required.
67
In discussing the first factor, the "govern-
mental purpose in securing the information,"
Justice Harlan focused on whether those under
a statutory duty to report were "inherently
suspect." Although he considered that those
required to report under the Byers hit-and-run
statute could not be characterized as inherently
suspect, 8 he suggested "that the 'inherently-
suspect-class' factor is relevant only as an indi-
cium of genuine risk as assessed from the indi-
vidual's point of view." 69 Thus, while noting
"the regulatory scheme's concededly non-crim-
inal purpose, ' 70 Justice Harlan still maintained
that it posed "genuine risks of self-incrimina-
tion from the driver's point of view. '171 '
Perhaps because he may have regarded the
necessity for self-reporting as obvious in the
hit-and-run context,72 Justice Harlan neglected
to make explicit how his second factor applied.
He simply concluded that self-reporting was a
necessary means of securing the information.
Regarding the third factor, the nature of the
disclosures required, Justice Harlan empha-
sized that under the California hit-and-run
statute, a minimal level of disclosure was re-
quired. Even after the driver stopped and left
his name and address, the state still had to
investigate further to determine whether the
driver's involvement in the accident was proxi-
mately related to the criminal behavior. Thus,
the state still bore a significant and not merely
ritualistic "burden of making the main eviden-
tiary case"'73 against the driver. On balance
then, Justice Harlan found that the California
reporting statute did not force the defendant
67 Id. at 454..
SSee id. at 456.
Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 456.
7 Id. at 448.
72 There will undoubtedly be circumstances in
which there will be no report if the driver leaves the
scene of the accident without leaving any .informa-
tion. This would, of course, frustrate the state's
regulatory purpose of ensuring financial responsibil-
ity for accidents.
73 402 U.S. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
to violate his Orivilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
On the basis of the Court's analysis in the
above cases it is difficult to know whether the
self-reporting/required records exception will
or will not operate to compel corporate officers
and employees to answer the eleven questions.
Initially it should be noted that if the privilege
is not recognized for the individual officer or
employee to whom the questions are addressed
and if he fears that his response may incrimi-
nate him, he is faced with the "cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.174 A
truthful answer may be the equivalent of self-
accusation and lead to criminal penalties for
the commission of"a crime. A false answer may
lead to a perjury prosecution because the offi-
cer or employee is required to sign his written
answers to the questions "in either affidavit
form or as a written declaration made under
the penalities of perjury. ' 75 An individual who
willfully makes a false statement on such a
form is subject to prosecution under either
section 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code or
under 18 U.S.C. §1001.76 Finally, silence could
lead either to criminal penalties or to a con-
tempt penalty. If the officer or employee re-
fuses to answer the eleven questions, he could
be prosecuted under section 7203 for failure to
supply information requested by the IRS. Al-
ternatively, the IRS could issue a summons
74 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964).
75 Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590, [1976]
9 STAND. FED. TAX REP..(CCH) 6567.
76 Periury is a felony. Anyone convicted under
I.R.C. § 7206 can be fined up to $5000 or imprisoned
up to three years or both. But in United States v.
Levy, 533 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1976), the court over-
turned a perjury conviction under § 7206 because tije
defendant had answered questions on an IRS form
which was not authorized under the Internal Reve-
nue Code or under a valid regulation. The 11 ques-
Lions are currently being asked pursuant to a directive
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. They
are not, as far as is known, specifically authorized
under any statute or regulation. Under the Levy
rationale, there could be no perjury conviction under
§ 7206 until the 11 questions were specifically author-
ized by statute or regulation.
However, even in the absence of a statutory or
regulatory authorization for the eleven questions, the
"cruel trilemma" remains. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1970), anyone who willfully makes false, fiaudulent
or fictitious statements regarding "any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States" can be fined and imprisoned.
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under section 760277 directing him to testify. If
he persists in his refusal to testify, the IRS can
sue for enforcement of the summons under
section 7604, and then a district court judge
could find the officer or employee to be in
contempt and punish him accordingly.7 8 Under
section 7602 the officer or employee might also
be summoned to appear before a grand jury to
testify. Similarly, in the grand jury situation
the officer or employee would potentially face
the cruel trilemma 7
9
Under the self-reporting/required records
exception, however, this risk to the individual
must be considered in light of the government's
need for information. Under the substantial
hazards-real risk test, as applied by the Byers
plurality, it is necessary to ask whether the
target group (here officers and employees of a
large corporation) forms a "highly selective"
group "inherently suspect of criminal activi-
ties."80 Unfortunately, the Byers plurality opin-
ion give little guidance regarding what is meant
by a "highly selective" group. The plurality
indicated that the target group was "all persons
who drive automobiles in California" 81 and that
this group was essentially equivalent to the
public at large. But this group of drivers is
actually a group selected out of the general
populace. Furthermore, the statute chose driv-
ers involved in accidents causing property dam-
age as the actual target group-a group not
only more selective but also more "inherently
suspect of criminal activities" than drivers in
" Under § 7602, the Secretary .of the Treasury or
his delegate is authorized, for the purpose of deter-
mining the correctness of a tax return or the amount
of tax due. "[t]o summon the person liable for tax
...or any officer or employee of such person ...
to appear before the Secretary ... to give such
testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry." I.R.C. § 7602(2). The IRS has
directed its agents to use the § 7602 summons to
obtain answers to the 11 questions from unwilling
officers and employees. See Simmons, supra note 8,
at 25.7 I.R.C. § 7604(b) authorizes the judge upon a
hearing, "to make such order as he shall deem
proper ... to enforce obedience with the require-
ments of the summons and to punish such person
for his default or disobedience."
7' For a description of the government's use of
grand juries in tax investigations, see Namnorato, The
Govern ments Tal.% in the Investigation of a Criminal
Fraud Case, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. Tax. 1019, 1056-60
(1976).
402 U.S. at 431 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion).
x' Id. at 430.
general. Thus a reasonable 'argument could
have been made that the group in Byers met
the "highly selective-inherently suspect" crite-
ria. 2 In applying the Byers plurality's "highly
selective-inherently suspect" test to the officers
and employees of large corporations who are
asked to respond to the eleven questions, it is
possible to argue either that they belong to a
group which is permissibly selective or to a
group which is impermissibly "highly selective."
It could be argued, for instance, that the offi-
cers and employees of these corporations are
not members of a highly selective group since
the IRS follows a pattern of subjecting larger
corporations to an ever-increasing likelihood of
a tax audit. For example, in 1975, corporations
with assets under $50,000 had only a 3.2%
chance of being audited; however, corporations
with assets over $100 million had an 82.1%
chance of being audited."' Since there is clearly
a greater potential for increased revenue collec-
tion from the larger corporations, the IRS's
greater concern for auditing large corporations
is understandable and well within its valid reg-
ulatory role. On this basis then, the selectivity
of the eleven questions would appear to be
comparable to the level of selectivity found to
be permissible in Byers. Under the Byers statute,
all drivers involved in accidents causing prop-
erty damage were required to report; under
the eleven questions, key officers and employ-
ees of all corporations with assets above $250
million are required to report. On the other
hand, the questions are directed at a relatively
small group-if one considers the population
at large. They are directed at corporations of a
size which can afford to pay significant bribes
or wield untoward political influence-as op-
posed to all corporations. They are also di-
rected at those within the corporation likely to
have knowledge of these activities. But these
individuals are also the ones most likely to have
been involved in illegal activity. Although the
IRS employs a selective process in directing the
eleven questions to "corporate officials and
employees that have had sufficient authority,
control or knowledge of corporate activities
so as to be aware of any possible misuse of
'Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan thought
that the statute in Byers was clearly directed at a
group suspected of illegal activities. See id. at 461
(Black, J., dissenting).




funds,"8 4 this level of selectivity should not, of
itself, require this group to be characterized as
impermissibly selective. It would be highly im-
practical to require that the IRS's eleven ques-
tions be addressed to everyone of a large cor-
poration's employees to avoid being "highly
selective." A level of selectivity based on the
officer's or employee's presumed "authority,
control or knowledge" merely represents an
efficient utilization of the IRS's resources. Fur-
thermore, while some corporate officers and
employees might have engaged in criminal ac-
tivities, the entire group would not be consid-
ered to be inherently suspect of criminal activi-
ties. Consequently, as a group, the corporate
officers and employees stand in sharp contrast
to the members of the Communist party in
Albertson and the gamblers in Marchetti and
Grosso. In Albertson, everyone who registered
and admitted membership in the Communist
party would have been directly confessing an
element of a crime. 5 Similarly, in Marchetti
and Grosso, everyone who registered or paid
the occupational tax would have "subjected
him[self] to possible state or federal prosecu-
tion." ' 6 By contrast, the majority of corporate
officers and employees who respond to the
eleven questions are not suspect of any crime
and do not face the threat of prosecution.8 7
Thus, although the conclusion is not free from
all doubt, if the Byers plurality's approach were
used to determine whether the corporate offi-
cer.1 and employees faced a real risk of self-
incrimination, it is probable that a court would
find that the officers do not form a "highly
selective" group that is "inherently suspect."88
11 Internal Revenue News Release IR-1590, [1976]
9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6567.
'5 Membership in the Communist party is an ele-
ment of a crime under both the membership clause
of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), and under
§4(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50
U.S.C. § 783(a) (1970).
390 U.S. at 47.
8 A preliminary report by the IRS on the status of
its 11 questions investigation revealed that out of
responses by 896 corporations, only 71 showed evi-
dence of possible criminal fraud. DAILY TAX RE-
PORT (BNA), June 6, 1977 at G-7. Thus as a group,
the corporate officers- and employees would appear
not to be "inherently suspect."
" Regardless of whether one characterizes corpo-
rate officials as a select group, the real problem with
the Byers plurality's approach is that, in effect, it
equates a finding that there is a real risk of' self-
incrimination with a finding that there is a "highly
The officers face no real risk by answering the
questions.
Under the alternative Byers approach pro-
posed by Justice Harlan, the analytical starting
point is to see whether there is "an assertedly
noncriminal governmental purpose in securing
the information."8' 9 With regard to tax collec-
tion procedures, the courts have generally pre-
sumed such a non-criminal purpose. For exam-
ple, in Grosso the Court declared, "[t]he princi-
pal interest of the United States must be as-
sumed to be the collection of revenue." 0 While
the presumption of a valid regulatory purpose
is rebuttable, it would seem that the IRS would
have little difficulty in establishing that there is
a valid regulatory, non-criminal purpose to the
eleven questions. The IRS is interested in ascer-
taining the proper amount of tax due. Al-
though the IRS's questions are directed to the
corporation's officers and employees, their an-
swers relate directly to whether the corporation
has taken any illegal deductions. By statute,
deductions are not allowed for certain types of
payments92 and the IRS fulfills its regulatory
duty when it checks to see that no improper
deductions are taken. Nonetheless, although
the underlying purpose of the questions relates
to a valid regulatory duty, the questions, in
their present form, are not narrowly directed
at the problem of illegal deductions. 92
selective" group "inherently suspect of criminal activ-
ities." If the latter doesn't exist, neither does the
former. Yet a determination that a group is "highly
selective" or "inherently suspect" is merely one factor
in the determination of whether a member of the
group faces a real risk. It is quite possible that
members of groups which are not highly selective or
inherently suspect may still face substantial hazards
of self-incrimination. For example, regardless of the
selectivity of the group, the amount of regulation
that a group is subject to can affect the amount of
risk faced by the group members who are required
to file a statment. In United States v. Whitehead, 424
F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1970), Judge McCree, dissenting
in part, noted that while distillers did. not constitute
a "group inherently suspect of criminal activities,"
they were "involved in a business which is subject to
extensive state and federal controls." Consequently,
he reasoned that "compliance with the disclosure
provisions of the alcohol tax laws" would create a
risk of self-incrimination that was not "merely trifling
or imaginary." Id. at 453 (McCree, J., dissenting in
part).
89 402 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
90 390 U.S. at 68.
91 See note 12 supra.
92 The 11 questions should be rewritten to focus
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Justice Harlan's second factor, "the necessity
for self-reporting as a means for securing the
information"9 : differentiates the eleven ques-
tions from the Byers situation. Although as in
Byers, a driver involved in an accident might
flee the scene leaving virtually no clue to his
involvement, the IRS has alternative means of
securing the information the eleven questions
are aimed at uncovering. The corporate books
and records can be examined by the IRS for
clues of improper activities. While a routine
audit might not uncover illegal ,corporate pay-
ments, a more intensive IRS audit of the cor-
porate books and records would be more likely
to uncover irregularities in the corporation's
books. 94 In addition, corporate officers and
employees not claiming the fifth amendment
privilege would be required to render some
on deductions and not on the broader topic of pay-
ment made by the corporation. Then the questions
would relate directly to the tax liability of the cor-
poration and the regulatory purpose of the questions
becomes more apparent.
In United States v. Richards, 77-1 USTC T 9362
(E.D. Va. 1977), a corporate president refused to an-
swer 8 of the 11 questions. The court refused to
enforce an IRS summons directing the president to
answer the questions in their present form. The
court noted:
[T]he scope of at least some of the questions
involved here by their very phraseology relate
to potentially illegal papnents, not deductioni
made by the Corporation, and to that extent,
constitute a "fishing expedition" beyond the
relevant scope of an Internal Revenue Service
investigation. If, for example, the Corporation
had made such illegal payments but had not
utilized such payments to affect its tax liability
in any manner, such payments would be beyond
the scope of the present investigation.
Id. (emphasis in original). However, the court re-
solved the matter by simply rewriting the questions
to relate directly to the corporation's tax liability and
then directed the corporation president to answer
the rewritten questions.
93 402 U.S. at 454 (Harlan. J., concurring in the
judgment).
9 A more extensive audit might well reveal that:
Significant changes in the amounts paid to for-
eign consultants, discrepancies in amounts paid
to different consultants providing essentially the
same services, unusual investments or loans, the
sudden writeoff of a loan, foreign subsidiaries
showing minimal revenues or accumulated de-
ficits, and transfers of large cash amounts to
foreign units.
Schellhardt, Many Big Coiporation. Face Tax-Fraud
Cases in Slush-Fund Audits, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1976,
at 10, col. 1 (midwest ed.).
minimal assistance to the IRS in its investiga-
tion.OS
The final factor to be considered in using
the Harlan approach is the nature of the disclo-
sure required. In Byers the disclosures were
kept to a minimal level. Disclosure of only the
name and address of the driver was required
by the Byers reporting statute. However, under
the eleven questions, the disclosures are of a
more detailed nature and relate to an area in
which there are numerous criminal statutes. 96
A corporate officer or employee who acknowl-
edges that the corporation has engaged in
bribes and kickbacks, or has in some way sup-
ported or opposed a foreign or domestic polit-
ical candidate, might be incriminating himself.
The fifth amendment provides a privilege
against self-incrimination to anyone who is
compelled to give an answer "which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant. ' 97 If the officer or
employee revealed information about illegal
activities in which he had himself participated,
this information could be a "link in the chain
of evidence" leading to his prosecution because
it could be introduced into evidence as a party
admission.98 Thus, if the officer or employee
could be compelled to respond to the eleven
questions, the state's evidentiary burden might
well be reduced to "a merely ritualistic confir-
mation of the 'conviction' secured through
compliance with the reporting requirement." 99
If Justice Harlan's approach were utilized in
the eleven questions situation, a corporate offi-
cer or employee who feared self-incrimination
would be able to make a valid fifth amendment
claim. Justice Harlan's second and third condi-
tions for compelling testimony under a re-
quired records rationale are absent. Alternative
" Under the eleventh of the 11 questions, these
corporate officers and officials would be required
to state whether they knew of any "present or former
corporate officers, directors, employees or other
persons acting on behalf of the corporation (who)
may have knowledge" concerning the issues raised by
the 11 questions. Internal Revenue News Release
IR-1590, [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 116567.
96 Criminal statutes which are potentially applica-
ble to the officers and employees are listed in note 12
supra.
97 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951).
s See FED. R. EvIo. 801(d)(2)(A).




means of securing the information sought be
the eleven questions are available; consequently
there is no "necessity for self-reporting as a
means for securing the information." In addi-
tion, the detailed nature of the disclosures
required by the eleven questions necessitate
that the privilege against self-incrimination be
available to the officer or employee.
CLAIMING THE PRIVILEGE AT THE PROPER
TIME AND THE EFFECT OF IMMUNITY
Even if the Harlan approach is utilized, mak-
ing the privilege available to the corporate
officer or employee who fears self-incrimina-
tion in answering the eleven questions, the
officer or employee will not be protected if he
fails to assert the privilege before responding
to the questions. In Garner v. United States,100
the petitioner was a professional gambler who
disclosed his occupation. on his tax return.
Garner was later tried for conspiring in inter-
state gambling schemes. At his trial, the gov-
ernment introduced Garner's tax returns. Gar-
ner was convicted and later sought to have his
tax returns excluded on the basis of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The Supreme
Court held that Garner's failure to assert the
privilege on his return defeated his claim of
privilege. The Court held that the disclosures
were not compelled because it viewed them as
the voluntary testimony of a witness. Unless a
witness claims the privilege, the government is
entitled to "assume that its compulsory proc-
esses are not eliciting testimony that he deems
to be incriminating." 10 The Court reasoned
that this rule was "consistent with the funda-
mental purpose of the Fifth Amendment-the
preservation of an adversary system of criminal
justice."1 ° The Court rejected Garner's argu-
ment that he was in fact compelled to give
testimony because he feared that if he did not
complete his income tax return, he would be
prosecuted for failure to file a return under
section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code. 0 3
"oo 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
102Id. at 655.
102 Id.
103 Section 7203 states:
Any person ... required by this title or by
regulations made under authority thereof to
make a return .... keep any records, or supply
any information, who willfully fails to .. . make
such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by
The Court answered this argument with a
dictum that a valid'04 claim of privilege would
be a complete defense to the section 7203 pros-
ecution.
Applying Garner in the context of the eleven
questions, a corporate officer will not be able
to claim that he is being compelled to answer
the questions out of a fear of being prosecuted
under section 7203 for failure to supply infor-
mation since a "valid claim of privilege" would
be a defense to any such prosecution. Further,
as in Garner any privilege the officer or em-
ployee claims must be asserted before supply-
ing any information to the IRS or before testi-
fying in response to a summons. If he answers
before claiming the privilege, then the answers
given will be deemed not to have been com-
pelled. If the officer or employee does claim
the privilege, it seems probable that the claim
will have to be a particularized one with regard
to each question that he fears may lead to self-
incrimination. Garner repeated the dictum
from United States v. Sullivan which "indicated
that the privilege could be claimed against
specific disclosures sought on a return." 10 5
If a corporate officer or employee claims the
privilege, the IRS or a grand jury may still be
law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misde-
meanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both together with the
costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7203.
104 424 U.S. 648, 663. The Court shifted ground
slightly when, in a footnote, it indicated that "a
defendant could not properly be convicted for an
erroneous claim of privilege asserted in good faith."
Id. at 663 n.18 (emphasis added). Justices Marshall
and Brennan, who concurred in the result, empha-
sized their view that a "good faith erroneous assertion
of the privilege does not expose a taxpayer to crimi-
nal liability." Id. at 666 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment). Under § 7203 a taxpayer might face
prosecution without first having had ajudicial deter-
mination of the validity of his fifth amendment claim.
By way of contrast, if the IRS had proceeded against
Garner by using its summons power, then before
Garner would be subject to contempt of court, the
district court would have to rule on his claim of
privilege. Because a prior judicial determination of
the invalidity of the taxpayer's claim was not a pre-
requisite to a § 7203 prosecution, Justices Brennan
and Marshall felt that "a good faith erroneous claim
of privilege entitles a taxpayer to acquittal under §
7203." Id. at 668.
105 424 U.S. at 650. See text accompanying note 31
supra.
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able to compel his testimony through a grant
of immunity."' The grant Qf use immunity
would prohibit the government from using the
individual's testimony or information derived
from his testimony in a criminal case against
that individual.
1 0 7
The constitutionality of the use immunity
statute was upheld in Kastigar v. United States.108
In Kastigar, the petitioners claimed that full
transactional imjnunity-that is, complete im-
munity from prosecution regarding the matters
about which testimony is given -was necessary
to compel testimony against a claim of privi-
lege. The Court held that transactional immu-
nity need not be given because it gave the
witness "considerably broader protection"' °9
than he enjoyed under the fifth amendment.
The Court held that a grant of immunity from
use and derivative use of the testimony put the
witness and the government "in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed
his privilege."" 0 Since the immunity granted
was "coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination," it was "sufficient to
compel testimony over a claim of privilege.'''
But while a grant of use and derivative use
immunity generally is constitutionally sufficient
to compel testimony, it is an insufficient shield
for a witness who may face prosecution in a
1-18 U.S.C. §6002 (1970) authorizes a grant of
immunity to be given in proceedings before or ancil-
lary to a grand jury or an agency of the United
States. 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1970) authorizes an agency
to issue a grant of immunity under § 6002. However,
the present policy of the IRS appears to be to refrain
from employing §6004. See Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. at 652 n.6 (1976).
107 Section 6002 provides use and derivative use
immunity:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information .. .and the per-
son presiding over the proceeding communi-
cates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witiess may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be
.used against the witness in any criminal case....
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
'406 U.S. 441 (1972).
'c Id. at 453. The transactional immunity statute,
18 U.S.C. §2514, ha been repealed. See Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. 1.. No. 91-452, §
227(a), 84 Stat. 922.
n. 406 U.S. at 458-59.
"I Id. at 453.
foreign country, because a grant of immunity
given by an American court cannot be enforced
in the foreign country.1 2 Officials in a foreign
country might become aware of the officer's or
employee's admitted violation of their country's
laws and move to extradite and try him in their
country. Even testimony under a grant of im-
munity before a grand jury, whose proceedings
are supposed to be secret, subjects the corpo-
rate officer or employee to this risk. Grand
jury "leaks" and subsequent newspaper public-
ity are no longer rare events."' Whether a
witness who has been given a grant of immunity
can still assert the privilege against self-incrim-
ination and refuse to testify in such a situation
is uncertain.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission," 4 the
petitioners were offered immunity under state
law. They still refused to testify because they
feared that their answers might incriminate
them under federal law. The Court held that
the privilege protected "a state witness against
incrimination under federal as well as state law
and a federal witness against incrimination un-
der state as well as federal law."" 5 But before
the Court reached its decision, it undertook an
extensive examination of both the English and
American cases dealing with the scope of the
privilege." 6 The Court cited the English Rule
of United States of America v. McRae' 7 with
approval."" In McRae the United States sued
the defendant in England for an accounting of
money which it claimed he had received fr'om
the Confederacy during the Civil War. The
defendant refused to answer questions because
he claimed that this would incriminate him
under the laws of the United States. The Lord
112 If officials in a foreign country decided to
ignore the grant of immunity and prosecute the
witness, the American court would have no power to
enforce its grant of immunitN.
".. The problem of self-incrimination under the
laws of a foreign countr is more likely to occur in
proceedings before a grand jury than in proceedings
before a court. For example, if the IRS attempted to
get a summons enforced and the corporate officer
or employee defended on the grounds of self-incrim-
ination, the court could take more effective protectihe
measures (e.g., in camera proceedings) than could a
grand jury to assure that no-leaks occurred.
'- 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
ln Id. at 78.
"
6 See id. at 58-77.
"L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867).
8 The Court described .lIcRae as representing
"the most recent authoritative annoncement of ilhe
English Rule." 378 U.S. at 67.
COMMENTS (Vol. 69
CORPORATE SLUSH FUNDS
Chancellor sustained the defendant's claim of
privilege stating that the case before the court
was indistinguishable "from one where a wit-
ness is protected from answering any question
which has a tendency to expose him to forfei-
ture for a breach of our own municipal law."" 9
Though the Supreme Court suggested in
Murphy that it might grant the privilege to one
who fears prosecution under foreign laws, the
Court has not conclusively decided this issue.
In Zicarelli v. Investigation Commission ,'2 the
appellant refused to answer questions put to
him by a state investigation commission after
he was given immunity. Zicarelli claimed that
he feared foreign prosecution. However, only
one question of the one hundred questions he
refused to answer posed "a substantial risk of
incrimination under foreign law.''2 That ques-
tion asked: "In what geographical area do you
have Cosa Nostra responsibilities? '12 2 The
Court noted that "the context in which the
question is asked imparts additional meaning
to the question and clarifies what information
is sought."'12 3 The commission was interested
solely in Zicarelli's activities in the New Jersey
area, and its questions were accordingly New
Jersey oriented. Thus Zicarelli could have
easily avoided incriminating himself under
foreign law by limiting his response to a de-
scription of his activities in the New Jersey
area. Accordingly, the Court found that he was
"never in any real danger of being compelled
to disclose information that might incriminate
him under foreign law.' 124 The Court thus
found it unnecessary to reach the question
whether the privilege would have been avail-
19 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 67
(quoting MeRae, L.R. 3 Ch. App. at 87).
120 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
121 Id. at 479-80.
1'2 Id. at 480.
123 Id. The information expected by the questioner
in response to the question is not determinative of
whether the privilege is applicable. Rather, the privi-
lege is dependent upon "what a truthful answer
might disclose." Id. In Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951), the Court announced a standard
for determining the availability of the privilege. It
stated:
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.
Id. at 486-87.
1-'4 06 U.S. at 480.
able to Zicarelli if he actually faced foreign
prosecution.
Although the Supreme Court has never de-
cided whether the privilege would protect a
witness who refused to answer questions be-
cause he might incriminate himself under the
the laws of a foreign country, other courts
have reached this question. Both the fifth and
tenth circuits have held that a witness who has
been given a grant of immunity to testify before
a grand jury cannot refuse to testify for fear
that he will incriminate himself under the laws
of a foreign country. In In re Parker,2 5 the
tenth circuit reasoned that the witness was in
no danger of incriminating himself because his
testimony was to be given before the- grand
jury and Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure prevents disclosure of tes-
timony given before a grand jury unless a court
orders the disclosure. Because such a court
order would be contrary to both grand jury
secrecy and to the court's own promise of
immunity, the tenth circuit held that the wit-
ness should be required to testify. 26 Similarly,
the fifth circuit in In re Tiernev"27 held that the
witness should testify because grand jury se-
crecy afforded by Rule 6(e) precluded any
substantial risk of foreign prosecution.
28
A contrary position upholding the right of a
witness who was offered immunity to refuse to
testify for fear of prosecution under the laws
of a foreign country was taken in In re
Cardassi.12 9 As in Parker and Tierney, the witness
refused to answer questions even after being
given immunity. However, stating that the "the
constitutional protection of the witness must
rest on more than faith,'13 0 the Carda.ssi court
rejected the argument that reliance upon Rule
6(e) would sufficiently protect the witness. 3 1
125411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated and re-
manded for dismissal as moot sub nom. Parker v. United
States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
226 411 F.2d at 1069-70.
127 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
'
2 Id. at 811.
129 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
130 Id. at 1082.
"I A case involving an officer or employee of a
major American corporation would be likely to attract
a greater amount of attention than would the average
case. As public interest in a case rises, the incentives
to breach the grand jury wall of secrecy also increase.
One writer expressed concern that "the alarming
rise in grand jur) investigations of celebrated people
has placed enormous strains on a grand jury's se-
crecy." Fahringer, The Problem of Grand Juty Leaks,
TRIAL, May. 1976, at 33.
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The court noted that there were effective safe-
guards against the use of compelled testimony
in American courts by federal or state officials.
Either the testimony could be excluded or the
conviction set aside. By contrast, the witness
who feared prosecution by a foreign govern-
ment was protected by no such safeguards. If
the United States had an extradition treaty or
convention with a foreign government, a court
would merely certify to the Secretary of State
in an extradition proceeding whether the evi-
dence was "sufficient to sustain the charge
under the proper treaty or convention.1yu The
court in certifying "probable cause" to allow
extradition would not have an opportunity to
pass upon the person's possible fifth amend-
ment claims. The American court would have
have no power to speculate upon the foreign
government's possible violation of the defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights. Also the court,
in certifying whether extradition might take
place, would not be abusing its judicial power
by refusing to consider the defendant's fifth
amendment claim during the extradition hear-
ing, it would be "simply declining to interfere
in an area of traditional executive control."1 3
Because post-testimony control of information
would be diffult if not impossible to maintain
when foreign governments are involved, Car-
dassi decided it was necessary to avoid the
problem of post-testimony control by refusing
to order the witness to testify.
The position taken by the court in Cardassi
appears to be more in harmony with Murphy
Rule 6(e) specifically provides: "Disclosure of mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury . . . may be
made to the attorneys for the government for use in
the performance of their duties." FED. R. CRI M. P.
6(e). Disclosure to United States Attorneys may lead
to information leaks. In the context of the receipt of
confidential tax information by United States Attor-
neys, a caution was raised: "United States Attorneys
are political appointees. Placing confidential material
in their hands raises a potential for abuse .... Prob-
lems have arisen regarding alleged leaks of tax infor-
mation by United States Attorneys." REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 916 (Oct. 1975).
132 18 U.S.C. § 13184 (1970).
133 In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1085.
and Zicarelli than the fifth and tenth circuit
cases. The Cardassi decision recognizes that
Murphy approved of the English Rule1 3 1 which
would protect a witness against incriminating
himself under both foreign and domestic laws.
Furthermore, Cardassi takes a more practical
view of the Zicarelli substantial risk test.13 5 As
noted earlier, grand jury leaks are not rare. 36
Consequently, reliance on Rule 6(e) is insuffi-
cient to protect the witness from the possibility
of self-incrimination under the laws of a for-
eign country.
CONCLUSION
The eleven questions which the IRS is asking
in its audits of the 1200 largest American cor-
porations present the threat of subjecting the
officers and employees of these corporations
to the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, per-
jury or contempt. The self-reporting and re-
quired records exception to the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination has,
under certain circumstances, been able to over-
come the individual's privilege. While both the
theory and the application of the self-reporting
and required records exception are still evolv-
ing, the approach suggested by Justice Harlan
in Byers provides the most satisfying theoretical
framework for an application of the exception.
Under Justice Harlan's approach, the officers
and employees would be able to claim the fifth
amendment privilege.
If the government wants to obtain the testi-
mony of the corporate officer or employee, it
may be able to do so by offering him use
immunity. However, use immunity will not
provide an adequate protection to an individual
who faces a substantial risk of prosecution
under the laws of a foreign country. In this
situation, the courts are divided on whether an
individual who has been granted immunity can
be compelled to testify. However, the better
position appears to be the one which allows the
individual to remain silent without fear of any
penalty for his silence.
JOHN.. W. EGAN
'a See text accompanying notes 117-18supra.
135 See text accompanying notes .121-24supra.
136 See note 131 supra.
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